We examine the Lifeline Assistance Program to consider factors that cause people to not participate in a program that provides financial benefits. Using panel data we employ a feasible generalized least squares estimation in which the dependent variable is the logit of the Lifeline participation rate. Our unique database incorporates characteristics of the eligible population (rather than characteristics of the general population), to enable us to consider why many eligible beneficiaries do not enroll. We find incumbent telecommunications providers' efforts to enroll beneficiaries to be statistically significant, and that owning one's home and having a female head of household are associated with greater participation in the program while being elderly and having less education are associated with less participation. Additionally, we find that an increase in the local phone rate is associated with increased participation. Our findings are important for regulatory policy surrounding the Lifeline program and universal service programs generally. 
I. Introduction
Situations arise in which persons fail to enroll in public assistance programs even though they would financially benefit from the assistance. In this paper, we examine participation in a unique public assistance program, the Lifeline Assistance Program (Lifeline), which is a nationwide program created by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to provide price discounts to low-income telephone subscribers. 1 The program is unusual in that utility regulators -not institutions specialized in social services -created the program and oversee it. Recently policymakers and incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) in Florida have been concerned that the numbers used for estimating eligible households and the participation rates that are based on those numbers may be flawed and, therefore, that the strategies used to publicize the program may not be optimal. ILECs have a specific interest in Lifeline participation. ILECs in Florida requesting approval of the Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) to increase local telephone rates must demonstrate a commitment to helping low-income households obtain telephone service. The Lifeline program is one method by which the ILECs can positively impact the low-income population, and so a thorough understanding of participation decisions is essential for them.. The FCC includes Lifeline program statistics in many of its annual telecommunications reports, and many states produce individual reports. 4 These reports provide excellent information on the status of the Lifeline program; however, they provide only limited analysis of factors that drive the rate of participation.
In addition to being among the first attempts to analyze the determinants of Lifeline participation, this study improves the existing literature through use of a unique database that incorporates the characteristics of the population eligible to receive the Lifeline benefit. By focusing on characteristics of the eligible households (as opposed to focusing on characteristics of all households in a geographic area), we believe that our study is better able to explain participation decisions of the subset of the population that is actually eligible to receive support.
Our results illustrate that company efforts to enroll beneficiaries are important, and that demographic measures such as ethnicity and gender are not as significant as a householder's age or education level. Some telephone companies appear to experience greater levels of Lifeline participation than other companies, although the magnitudes of these effects are relatively small; specifically, BellSouth and Verizon are associated with greater Lifeline participation rates in Florida relative to smaller telephone companies. We also find that low-income households in our study increase their participation in the Lifeline program when faced with higher prices for local telephone service, and that customers decrease their participation in Lifeline when they increase their use of cell phones. This analysis presents important results for ILECs concerned with maintaining a profitable telephone rate structure and for regulators involved in evaluating rate structures. Additionally, it provides regulators with information that might be used to encourage telecommunications providers to more effectively target potential Lifeline subscribers. Finally, the analysis provides important information for policymakers interested in increasing Lifeline participation rates in Florida and nationwide, and for those interested in increasing welfare program participation generally.
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II. Review of Related Research
Recently the FCC and various state regulatory authorities have begun to question the effectiveness of efforts to promote the Lifeline program. Rodini et al. (2003) illustrate this relationship between mobile and fixed line phone service. In particular, they find that fixed line and mobile services are reasonable substitutes for one another, and that subsidies to wireline carriers for universal service may be unjustified.
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Currently, the Lifeline program is tangentially addressed in two areas of economics research: the effectiveness and importance of universal service in general, and the economics of welfare participation. Academic papers addressing federal assistance programs designed to increase telephone penetration rates (typically referred to as universal service programs) have almost unanimously determined that such programs are ineffective and/or inefficient. For example, Rosston and Wimmer (2000) find that federal universal service programs have little effect on telephone penetration rates, adversely affect the market through large taxes, and adversely affect competition. Valletti et al. (2002) add that different groups of consumers are affected by universal service programs in different ways, so that determining the actual benefits to society overall is difficult.
Regarding the cost-effectiveness of Lifeline specifically, Garbacz and Thompson (1997 find that due to small elasticities of demand for participation in the Lifeline program, extremely large expenditures per household on promoting Lifeline are required to increase the telephone penetration rate. Moreover, these effects have increased over the last decade; they find the Lifeline program to be ineffective, costly, and approximately nine times more expensive than a more targeted program might be. Similarly, Eriksson et al. (1998) focus on targeted versus untargeted subsidies in considering policies to promote universal service, and find that subsidies such as Lifeline are ineffective in the telecommunications industry.
With respect to participation in Lifeline, Burton et al. (2007) consider Lifeline participation across the US and find that bureaucratic costs and restrictions some Lifeline programs impose on supplementary services (such as call waiting and caller ID) discourage enrollee participation. They consider the outreach efforts of incumbent telecommunications providers as well as enrollment procedures and eligibility criteria to show that the traditional explanations for lack of participation (rooted in stigma) may not hold for the Lifeline program.
While their paper informs our study and complements our results, differences in our works exist because Florida is not subject to many of the criteria included in Burton et al.'s study. 9 In a US study more complementary to theirs, Hauge et al. (2007) also find that demographics, socioeconomic factors, and service by specific traditional telephone companies affect Lifeline participation rates. These papers begin to bridge the gap between the usefulness of universal service (and therefore the Lifeline program) and the economics of welfare participation. They do not, however, address the particular participation decisions of the population for whom the program is designed.
There is a large literature on participation in public assistance programs. Currie (2004) summarizes the literature with respect to the largest means-tested programs in the US. Research on participation in Food Stamps, Federal Public Housing Assistance (FPHA), Medicaid, the National School Lunch program (NSL), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is particularly relevant for our research, given that these welfare programs are frequently used to prove eligibility for Lifeline. Studies of participation in other welfare programs guide our empirical model and serve as useful references for predicting our results. Generally, the papers find that participation in welfare programs increases with the size of the entitlement, receipt of another welfare benefit, single parenthood, and the number of children. Participation falls with age, education, income level, urban living, white head of household, and work experience. Additionally, many studies searching for drivers of participation rates take into account intangible factors such as stigma and lack of information regarding the program, both of which would decrease participation in welfare programs (see Moffitt, 1983 and Hauge et al. 2007 ).
Some research supports theories that either lack of information or simply a choice not to participate are dominant effects on participation in welfare programs. After their review of the main empirical studies of welfare participation, Andrade et al. (2002, p. 310) 
IV. Methodology and Data
To analyze Lifeline participation rates, this study uses a theoretical model of household utility maximization and an empirical model that includes measures of demographic factors for eligible households at the county-level and company-specific measures to ascertain the determinants of the Lifeline participation rate. Assume that household i located in county j maximizes per period utility, given in equation (1), subject to the budget constraint given in equation (2).
(1)
Utility is a function of telephone subscription (T) and consumption of a composite good (Z),
where
for T ij , > 0, and U Z > 0 and U ZZ < 0. T ij ∈ {0,1}; the household faces a discrete choice to subscribe to telephone service or not to subscribe. 20 Income (I) and the price of telephone subscription (P) are exogenous, and the price of the composite good is normalized to one. Further assume that this household is eligible for the Lifeline program, which allows the household to purchase a fixed amount of telephone service at a discounted price. The price of telephone service when receiving the Lifeline benefit is the difference between P and the amount of the discount (S). In addition, it is possible there is some degree of stigma attached to Lifeline participation that may be a function of income and other individual characteristics. Moffit (1983) defines such stigma as "disutility arising from participation in a welfare program," which allows the inclusion of any non-monetary disutility associated with participating in a welfare
program. This more general idea is useful for our purposes. Assume the non-monetary disutility cost (C) must be subtracted from a household's utility if the Lifeline subsidy is accepted, and assume that this cost can vary across households.
Under the above assumptions, utility maximization implies the following decision rule for Lifeline participation:
U[T ij , I ij -(P j -S)×T ij ] ≥ C ij , and
do not participate otherwise.
We assume a utility gain from Lifeline participation for most eligible households, with the exceptions being those households with high non-monetary costs of participation. Given that we expect direct stigma costs to be low on average, our model predicts that most households will participate, an outcome not supported by the data. One possible explanation of this can be found in the previously mentioned PURC surveys. These surveys reveal a lack of information about the program to be a main reason for non-participation. For simplicity, assume that program knowledge (K) is a continuous variable ranging from zero to one, and equal to one if a household knows about the Lifeline program and equal to zero if the household is uninformed. The addition of program knowledge changes the utility maximizing rule to the following:
and
Thus, a household will choose to participate in Lifeline if and only if the utility associated with participating is greater than or equal to the utility associated with not participating and if and only if the household is aware of the program.
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Equation (4) implies an ambiguous effect of P on the probability of Lifeline participation.
While the first inequality implies participation is increasing in P since any increase in the price of telephone services makes the Lifeline subsidy more valuable, the second inequality implies participation decreases with P as a higher price for telephone services causes households to not purchase service at all (i.e., these households drop off the network entirely). We expect a higher price for telephone subscription to increase Lifeline participation if low income households tend to already have telephone service before deciding to participate in Lifeline, and we expect a higher price to have the opposite effect if low income households tend to not have telephone service absent a Lifeline discount. Also, since any increase in S makes the Lifeline program less expensive, the probability of Lifeline participation is increasing in the amount of the Lifeline subsidy. Furthermore, any increase in non-monetary disutility costs decreases the utility associated with participation; thus, Lifeline participation is decreasing in C. Finally, program knowledge is an important determinant of the decision to participate, and anything that increases program knowledge will increase the probability of Lifeline participation. From these initial premises we put forward two propositions.
Proposition 1: Lifeline program participation will vary by incumbent.
Incumbent telecommunications providers are responsible for informing consumers of the Lifeline program. Therefore, knowledge of the program depends directly on the outreach, enrollment, and notification activities of those companies. Over the course of our study, BellSouth, Sprint, and Verizon engaged in intensive publicity campaigns not undertaken by other providers: each school-aged child received information in his or her school "welcome" package of information to be brought home at the beginning of the academic year; sign-up forms were included in each telephone bill upon connection; and welfare agencies maintained a supply of their sign-up forms to be distributed with other materials to persons applying for other welfare such as TANF and SSI. Our model predicts eligible household participation will increase with greater information about Lifeline, increased application support, and simplified enrollment and notification procedures. The effort of incumbents is critical in each of these roles.
Proposition 2: Lifeline program participation will increase as non-monetary disutility falls.
This disutility varies by socio-demographic characteristics.
Included in our category of non-monetary disutility is traditional stigma as recognized in welfare participation literature, and also characteristics of households that may cause them to disfavor participation in welfare programs. We assert that these characteristics may include gender, race, age, and education, among other intangible factors peculiar to a household. With household-level data, the vector of household-level parameters γ is normally estimated using either probit or logit, depending on the assumed distribution of e. Furthermore, the matrix x ij of exogenous variables would include income, the amount of the Lifeline subsidy, the price of telephone services, non-monetary disutility, and knowledge of the Lifeline program, as well as measures that impact utility through the marginal utility of Lifeline participation relative to nonparticipation and the marginal utility of income. However, we do not observe household Lifeline choices in our data. Instead, we observe the number of Lifeline households that participate out of the number eligible within each Florida county. 22 Although we do not observe household decisions, we can use the utility maximization model discussed above to motivate our countylevel empirical analysis. If the data are generated in the manner given in equation (5), then the determinants of Lifeline participation at the county level will be the determinants at the household level (i.e., components of the matrix x ij ) aggregated up to the county level. Note that although the determinants at the county level are assumed to be the same as the determinants at the household-level, the coefficients from our county-level analysis cannot be interpreted as household-level effects due to aggregation issues. Specifically, we cannot recover the vector γ of household-level parameters.
Dependent Variable
As discussed above, Lifeline subscribers choose to subscribe on an individual household basis; however, our data set measures the sum of these decisions at the county level. Specifically, we observe the number of positive outcomes (Lifeline subscribers) based on a total number of potential positive outcomes (eligible households). Thus, our outcome variable is grouped in percentage terms: the number of subscribing households divided by the total number of eligible households. Models with grouped data are normally estimated with weighted least squares.
Weights are needed to account for the heteroskedasticity associated with observations being clustered by county. We employ a minimum logit chi-square specification in which the dependent variable is the logit of the Lifeline participation rate, i.e., the natural log of the Lifeline participation rate divided by one minus the Lifeline participation rate (Maddala, 1983, p. 30; Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, p. 620; Greene, 2003, p. 687) . 23 We construct our model using a complete panel of observations on all 67 Florida counties for the years 2003 through 2005. 24 The panel nature of the data allows us to use a random effects estimator. 25 In the random effects model, county-specific effects measuring unobservable county characteristics are modeled and estimated as being randomly distributed across counties. Our random effects specification is given in equation (5), where j indicates county, t indicates year, and ρ is the Lifeline participation rate.
The time-invariant, county-specific effect (u j ) is modeled and estimated as part of a wellbehaved, normally distributed error term (u j + ε jt ). The matrix X jt contains household and county measures for county j in year t, and the vector β and the constant term α represent parameters to be estimated. The equation is estimated using weighted feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), allowing the variance of u to vary by counties to control for heterogeneity across panels (Greene, 2003, pp. 293-298) .
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Matrix X jt of Explanatory Variables
Given the assumption concerning generation of the Lifeline participation data, the determinants of county-level participation rates should be the same measures included in matrix
x ij of equation (5) In the first category, we include a series of variables measuring the percentage of each county's telecommunications service that is provided by each company. This allows an estimate of a provider-specific effect for BellSouth, Sprint, and Verizon relative to all other carriers.
provider-specific variable is denoted by the provider's name. For example, the variable Percent BellSouth indicates the percentage of the county's total telecommunications service that is provided by BellSouth. That percentage is determined by weighting BellSouth's presence in the county by the number of access lines BellSouth has in each county for each year. We expect the provider-specific variables to pick up much of the effect of program knowledge on participation.
Given existing research and our theoretical model, we expect the local telephone rate to affect Lifeline participation; Local Phone Rate is the average monthly charge within a county for a single, residential line, which should affect the participation decision since higher rates make telecommunications service more costly for households. This has two potential impacts on Lifeline participation. One the one hand, the higher price increases the value of the Lifeline discount (the gain in utility for a poor household receiving an additional dollar is greater than the gain in utility for a wealthy household receiving an additional dollar.). This situation is represented in the first inequality in equation (4). 28 Studies of welfare participation overwhelmingly support the assertion that more valuable entitlements increase the probability of participation in a welfare program (Andrade et al., 2002) . However, on the other hand basic economic theory holds that when the price of a good increases the quantity demanded for that good falls. This situation is represented by the second inequality in equation (4) and the result of these two opposite effects is ambiguous.
While studies analyzing cell phone usage as substitutes or complements for landline phones differ in their conclusions, we assert that counties with greater cell phone usage should have lower Lifeline participation rates since a cell phone is in practice considered to be a good substitute for a landline phone (Rodini et al., 2003) and, according to a survey of Florida lowincome households, nearly 47 percent of those without wireline phones have cellular phones.
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expenditures is particularly important and the use of pre-paid cellular plans that serve to limit over-expenditure might be viewed favorably. Our assertions are supported in a recent study by Tucker, Brick and Meekins (2007) that shows landline and cellular phones more likely to be substitutes than complements for those of younger age, races other than White, and lower education, characteristics found to be associated with low-income households. To account for these possibilities, we measure cell phone usage on a county-wide, per household basis (Cell
Phones).
With respect to the second category of explanatory variables, characteristics of the eligible population, we expect socioeconomic characteristics of eligible households to influence the Lifeline participation rate. For this type of explanatory variable, we employ information from the University of Florida's Shimberg Center for Affordable Housing, which includes the number of households and the characteristics of households that qualify for Lifeline. Note that these measures reflect the distribution of characteristics within the eligible population, not necessarily within the county as a whole, and that these measures vary by county and by year. The use of characteristics of eligible households is a unique aspect of this study, allowing us to contribute to the literature by focusing on characteristics of households the program is specifically designed to assist as opposed to characteristics of a geographically defined area.
We expect that housing tenure will be a significant determinant of the Lifeline participation rate; therefore, we control for the percentage of eligible households that own their home (Percent Own Home) versus renting. If homeowners are more vested in housing services and move less often, then it is reasonable to believe that increased homeownership would lead to increased participation. Education level may influence the participation rate if more educated individuals have an easier time finding, understanding, and enrolling in benefits programs.
Conversely, if welfare stigma is a dominant determinant of participation, we would expect the participation rate to decrease with education as associations with more highly educated persons would discourage peers from applying for welfare. 30 We control for the percentage of heads of eligible households who did not finish high school (Percent No High School) and the percentage that has finished high school but has no further education (Percent High School), with the excluded category more than high school education. Studies evaluating participation in welfare programs have concluded that participation falls with education; however, we are unable to predict the effect of education due to contradictory participation incentives.
Various household characteristics may be associated with a greater propensity to enroll in public assistance programs, as prior studies have shown such characteristics to affect costs and preferences (Blundel et al., 1988; Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Hoynes, 1996) . We expect that race and gender of the head of the household will have an impact on the Lifeline participation rate, so (Blundell et al., 1988; Stuber and Kronebusch, 2004) . We might expect a positive correlation between age and participation given the assumed lower transaction costs of enrollment among the elderly; however, a combination of lack of knowledge about the program, stigma associated with welfare, and perceived lack of need for the subsidy lead us to predict a negative effect. 
V. Results
The results of the weighted FGLS estimation of equation (5) are presented in Table   Two . 32 Due to the non-linear construction of the dependent variable, the coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects of the independent variables on the Lifeline participation rate. In non-linear estimations, there are two methods commonly used to produce marginal effects:
compute the marginal effects at sample means, or simulate marginal effects. We simulate marginal effects by changing the relevant independent variable by one percent and comparing the pre-change and the post-change predicted participation rates using the coefficients from Table Two . In this way, we can compute the marginal effects and report them in elasticity terms.
Specifically, the reported marginal effects are interpreted as the percentage change in the participation rate associated with a one percent change in the independent variable (i.e., the elasticity of Lifeline participation with respect to the independent variable).
[INSERT Local Phone Rate is a significantly positive determinant of the Lifeline participation rate; in addition, demand for Lifeline service is inelastic with respect to changes in the local telephone rate. This result suggests that the effect of the first inequality in equation (4) dominates the second effect. This result implies that the magnitude of the increase in price in our model encouraged more eligible households to participate in Lifeline rather than encouraging more households to disconnect telephone service entirely.
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As expected, and in agreement with the findings of Rodini et al. (2003) and Tucker et al. (2007) , we find that counties with more cell phone usage have lower rates of Lifeline participation although the effect is small. Cell phone usage appears to serve as a substitute for landline phones among the low-income population studied, leading to a negative correlation between Cell Phones per household and the Lifeline participation rate.
With respect to characteristics of the eligible population, the socioeconomic characteristics of eligible households are generally found to influence the Lifeline participation rate. These results support our Proposition 2. Owning one's home (Percent Own Home) as opposed to renting has a positive and relatively large effect on participation. This is intuitively logical: as people invest in homeownership, ties to the community by which one might learn of the Lifeline program increase. Additionally, the disutility associated with signing up for the Lifeline program for a homeowner would be incurred only once. Since the Lifeline subsidy is provided only upon connecting phone service, a renter might not choose to incur the costs of signing up, assuming that he or she may be relocating in the near future and may then have to sign up again.
The coefficients on Percent No High School and Percent High School are negative,
implying that college-educated heads of households tend to sign up for Lifeline more often than less-educated heads of households. This positive relationship between education and Lifeline participation suggests that the ability to learn about and understand the program is a significant factor in determining the participation rate. Percent Female is positive and significant, which is consistent with our predication. In addition, the Lifeline participation rate is elastic with respect to female heads of households. Of the age categories, only Percent Age 75+ is significant and negative, an unsurprising result given that participation in welfare programs is frequently found to decrease with age. Furthermore, race is not found to be a significant factor.
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With respect to county-level socioeconomic characteristics, counties with more rural populations have lower Lifeline participation rates although the marginal effect is not large.
Rural households typically do not have the breadth of available substitutes that urban households do; therefore, they might be expected to sign up for landline service and subsequently Lifeline more than similar urban households. The fact that they do not indicates that they may be unaware of the program. Companies interested in increasing participation are likely to focus their outreach efforts where they can reach the most people at least cost; this would generally occur in more urban areas. Additionally, information regarding the Lifeline program is often located in welfare offices, which are generally in urban areas. This result should be of primary interest to regulators as one of the main goals of the Lifeline program is to advance universal service by promoting affordable telephone access to consumers residing in rural areas. 36 The fact that rural households are less likely to participate when they are the intended beneficiaries of the program suggests that companies' efforts to increase participation may not be correctly targeted. While it may be good business practice for companies to attempt to reach as many people as possible at the lowest possible cost, such a strategy may be missing those households the program is most concerned with helping.
As expected, the coefficient on Percent Welfare is positive and significant, indicating that receiving government assistance of another form has a positive and significant effect on Lifeline participation. Since non-monetary costs of applying for welfare decrease with receipt of other welfare, this result is expected. Additionally, the positive coefficient could result from scale economies in marketing Lifeline, given that the Lifeline program is advertised at welfare agencies. Our result also might reflect the possibility that higher concentrations of households receiving government assistance could lead to more points of contact for eligible households, resulting in greater word-of-mouth advertising for the program.
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Lastly, we note that our yearly dummy variables, Year 2004 and Year 2005, are both positive and significant. We assert that this reflects the growing concern with and interest in promoting the program among both state regulators and telecommunications companies. As awareness of the program increases and methods by which households can enroll are improved, we expect this trend to continue as long as the benefits of the subsidy outweigh the costs of participation.
VI. Conclusion
Telecommunications providers have a genuine interest in the rate of participation in the Lifeline program. Florida providers alone contributed over $18 million in the year 2004 to the Lifeline program. However, the program presents companies with conflicting incentives. It is costly to provide discounts on customers' bills; therefore, companies have incentive to limit participation. 38 On the other hand, companies must show support of low-income households for rate increases to be approved; therefore, companies have an incentive to increase participation.
The key for telecommunications providers is to ensure that the Lifeline program effectively targets those households most in need of support. In terms of regulating efforts to target households, the FCC and FPSC give companies informal guidance: statutes require that efforts to publicize the program be reasonably designed to reach those likely to qualify. This leads to our final comment, that our research sheds light on a specific component of the much broader question of the need for a universal service program. The cost-effectiveness of subsidies and the type of subsidy that would most benefit the goal of universal residential telephone service should be considered in light of these results. Our research supports the findings of others with respect to household characteristics that are associated with increased participation in public assistance programs. Lifeline is to some extent targeted in the sense that it focuses on low-income households (i.e., households who are most at risk of not affording telephone service). However, the discount is available to all low-income households, even those that would purchase telephone service without the discount. Therefore, this work supports the conclusion by others that the Lifeline program is costly and, as a subsidy that is only partially targeted, increasing the effectiveness of the program is exceedingly complicated. Additionally, if higher local phone rates do result in an increase in Lifeline participation, then higher local rates make the program even less targeted and therefore more costly. These questions should continue to be asked and analyzed on a broad scale so that the goal of universal service is evaluated practically, and if the goal is found to be useful, that it may be achieved in the most efficient possible manner. 3 The associated Link-Up program provides a one-time subsidy to households to offset the cost of initiating telephone service. Often the Lifeline and Link-Up programs are referenced together.
In our paper we focus on the Lifeline program due to its recurring benefits. 4 For example, see Florida Senate (2004) for an assessment of the Lifeline program in 2004.
5 There are also concerns about the usefulness of the program for promoting universal service.
We do not address this issue in this study. 6 California instituted its own eligibility requirements including self-certification of eligibility, which resulted in their having greater than 100 percent of eligible households participating over the years 2002 -2004. 7 Cellular providers are increasingly offering Lifeline discounts. For example, in Florida, Sprint / Nextel offers a discounted mobile phone plan to eligible low-income households. AT&T wireless offers a similar plan in Louisiana, Mississippi, Washington, and Oregon.
recipients can subscribe to call waiting, caller ID, and similar additional features while receiving Lifeline. Finally, the level of benefit is consistent throughout the state. Burton et al. incorporate each of these cross-state differences in their paper; however, these differences are not relevant to our work. 10 These surveys are available at www.purc.ufl.edu. In sum, the surveys found that lack of awareness and distrust of support programs for low-income households are significant barriers to enrollment. They also found that 88 percent of low-income households in Florida had wireline phones, about 50 percent had a cellular phone, about 50 percent had Internet access, and about 50 percent had either cable television or Direct Broadcast Satellite service. 11 We expect any stigma effect to be small. First, it is simple for participants to apply and they need not do so in person. Florida provides information on Lifeline in a customer's bill, along with a form requesting that the potential participant respond if he receives any of the other welfare programs which qualify him to receive Lifeline or to submit documentation of lowincome. The potential participant does not need to visit an agency or deal with social workers, nor does he have to publicly claim this benefit; it simply appears as a credit on his telephone bill each month. Such anonymity should decrease the stigma effect. Also, if the marginal disutility of enrolling decreases with participation in another program and if the primary way of qualifying for Lifeline is by showing receipt of other welfare, it seems logical that the cost of enrolling in Lifeline should be lower than the cost of enrolling in other welfare programs.
12 These funds come from fees assessed on telecommunications providers. 17 Link-Up is the federal program providing a credit for telephone hook-up service. Often the Lifeline and Link-Up programs are referred to simultaneously as they have the same goal of increasing telephone penetration in low-income areas. The primary difference is that Lifeline is a monthly credit, whereas Link-Up applies only at telephone installation. This study addresses only the Lifeline program. 18 Statistics are available at http://www.purc.ufl.edu/Lifeline2.htm.
19 Twenty-five states had higher participation rates than Florida during the years of our study (Hauge et al., 2006) ; while Florida's actual participation rate of 17.57% places it at the median, Florida's participation rate is below the national average participation rate of 23.16%. 20 Qualifying households receive the Lifeline discount on only one telephone line. Therefore second connections and prices for second connections are part of the composite good Z. 21 Burton et al. (2007) include an explanation in which the consumer surplus of various households is modeled to illustrate households for whom the level of benefit is relevant. Specifically, they illustrate that there are some households who are not willing and able to sign up for telephone service at all given a particular benefit level. There are other households who are willing and able to sign up for telephone service given that same level of benefit, and those who will subscribe to telephone service without Lifeline (even if they qualify). It is this category of eligible households whose decision not to subscribe is in question. 22 The number of Lifeline participants is provided by each company at the city level. We aggregate to the county level to correspond to the level of the eligible household data. 23 The weights are 1/[n i p i (1-p i )], where n i is the total eligible households of county i, and p i is the logit probability of the Lifeline participation rate in county i. As discussed by Greene (2003, p. 677-688), p i must be estimated since it is a function of unknown parameters. Following the prescribed procedure, we estimate p i using ordinary least squares (OLS) in a first stage because all that is needed is a consistent estimate of p i . The weights are then computed and used in a second-stage feasible generalized least squares estimation. Several specifications of the dependent variable are available. We choose the minimum logit chi-square estimator due to its similarity to the well-known logit dichotomous choice model. To test robustness, we estimated the model using another commonly employed specification in which the dependent variable is simply the log of the participation rate, finding no major differences between the two specifications. There are 13 year/county observations with zero subscribers. Rather than delete these observations, the number of subscribers is arbitrarily assigned to one in order to compute the dependent variable. Although clearly ad hoc, this solution is the most viable in our situation.
We also include a dummy variable in our estimation to account for the 13 observations; the dummy variable (not reported for brevity) is significantly negative. Number Portability charges. As explained in the description of the origins of Lifeline credits, the Lifeline subsidy is designed to remove these taxes from bills of eligible participants; thus, eligible households should pay only the local phone rate. While our theoretical model references a price of Lifeline that includes the subsidy, the subsidy does not vary by county. Therefore, it is appropriate to include Local Phone Rate as the proxy for price. Also, the Lifeline subsidy is not included in the estimation. 30 This is termed "peer group stigma effect" by Blundell et al., 1998 , who argue that associating with more educated individuals leads one to believe that he or she should not need public assistance but should be intelligent and motivated enough to provide for oneself. Therefore while more educated people might know of the Lifeline program, they might believe that it is for those unable to provide for themselves, not for well-educated individuals with skills to support themselves. 31 Approximately 9.8 million of 11.9 million single parents in the US are women (www.singleparent.com). 32 The model also includes yearly dummies (coefficients are not reported for brevity) to indicate a time trend in Lifeline participation that is common to all counties. The results (available from the authors) indicate that a positive shift in the participation rate occurred after 2003. 33 We report the Wald chi-square test statistic on the three provider variables: chi2( 3) = 81.86, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, indicating that the coefficients are jointly significant at the 1% level. 34 The positive coefficient for Local Phone Rate may also be due to omitted variable bias. It has been suggested that such a result could occur if telephone service is more valuable to lowincome households in counties where the local phone rate is higher, and therefore more eligible households subscribe to Lifeline service rather than declining all service. Additionally, the positive correlation between Local Phone Rate and the population-weighted average local calling area in a county (0.5215) may contribute to this result. 35 In other versions of the model, we control for percent white, percent black, percent Hispanic, and all other races. The results (available from the authors) show insignificant coefficients on all racial categories. As an analysis of potential multicollinearity, we assess the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all included variables. There is no objective standard to test whether there is "too much" multicollinearity using the VIF, but a conservative standard is that any variable with a VIF above 10 is highly collinear with other independent variables. The VIFs for the independent variables used are all below 8.9, well within the conservative standard. Thus, we do not believe that multicollinearity is a problem. 36 For detailed information on outreach efforts, see Holt and Jamison (2006) . See www.universalservice.org for stated goals of the Lifeline program and the Universal Service Fund. 37 Recall that Percent Rural and Percent Welfare measure all households in a given county; thus, these measures may impact both the number of eligible households that participate and the total number of eligible households (i.e., both the numerator and the denominator of the Lifeline participation rate), and one must be circumspect when interpreting the results with respect to these variables. 38 This is not to say that companies act on this incentive. There may be non-financial reasons for companies to promote Lifeline such as social concerns for public access to telecommunications. PSC-97-1262-FOF-TP). General requirements apply unless a complaint is made against a company, after which specific guidelines are set for the offending company. To date, no complaints have been filed against telecommunications companies in Florida.
